Less Developed Countries, Tourism Investments and Local Economic Development by Andergassen, Rainer & Candela, Guido
Less Developed Countries, Tourism Investments and Local
Economic Development∗
Rainer Andergassen†, Guido Candela
September 17, 2009
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126, Bologna, Italy
Abstract
The present paper analyzes the forward linkages of a multinational’s investment in a resort
which kicks off tourism activity in a LDC. We show that, under quite natural assumptions,
overnight stays are increasing in the number of tourism related, differentiated goods and ser-
vices supplied in equilibrium. These goods and services, if supplied by the local community,
represent forward linkages of FDI in tourism. We investigate the multinational’s incentives to pro-
mote, reduce or eliminate these forward linkages and the effectiveness of some policy instruments
available to a local government to leverage on the presence of FDI and to stimulate domestic
entrepreneurship.
Keywords: Tourism FDI; multinationals; economic development; domination strategies; LDC
JEL: L83; F23; O19;
∗The authors would like to thank Roberto Cellini and Antonello Scorcu for helpful comments.
†Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: rainer.andergassen@unibo.it, guido.candela@unibo.it
1
1 Introduction
Many policy makers view FDI as a way to further the process of wealth creation in the host country
and to help to jump-start the development process in less developed countries (LDCs). The impli-
cations in terms of economic policy are the creation of a favorable economic environment adapt to
attract FDI, consisting, for example, of special tax treatment, exemption from import duties or direct
subsidies. Academic literature studies the welfare effects of FDI on both the host and the home coun-
try, unveiling potential channels of welfare gains as well as welfare losses1. FDI create backward and
forward linkages in the host country (Rodriguez-Claire, 1996), that is vertical and horizontal exter-
nalities2. The negative competitive pressure effects of FDI are countered by productivity gains owing
to technology transfer and diffusion, access to knowledge capital and, on the account of learning by
doing and learning by observing, skill transfer. Technological upgrade and efficiency gains may also
be induced and accelerated by the competitive pressure effects of FDI, which drive inefficient firms in
the host country out of the market. Linkage effects on welfare may be positive or negative, depending
on the prevalence of positive productivity-efficiency effects and negative crowding out effects of local
firms. The host country may also benefit from market access spill-overs, which are due to the knowl-
edge acquisition of international marketing, the access to international distribution markets and the
opening up of international markets. In the home country, FDI may lead to productivity increases
because of economies of scale and learning curve effects, which counter negative employment effects
resulting from the international reallocation of production facilities.
In the present paper we study the effects of a multinational’s tourism investment on local economic
development3. FDI is often considered to be one of the most effective engines for harnessing the
development of capital, infrastructure and knowledge and for granting access to global marketing in
tourism. Therefore, LDCs often view the attraction of such investments as a leading tourism and
economic development strategy but the theoretical and empirical implications of tourism FDI on the
host country are not well studied and understood4.
FDI, which is mostly concentrated in hotels and restaurants, is most important for emerging tourism
economies, while it is relatively less important for developed and mature tourism markets. UNCTAD
1For a survey see, for example, Markusen (1995), Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), Hanson (2001), Lipsey (2004),
Navaretti and Venables (2004).
2FDI are often related to imperfection in the technology market, i.e. tacit knowledge, and framed in Dunning’s OLI
paradigm, that is ownership, location and internalization advantage (see Dunning, 1981, 1993 and Markusen 1995 for a
discussion).
3In a companion paper by Antonelli and Candela (2008) the relationship between multinationals and the development
of a tourism destination is investigated.
4The literature on FDI in tourism consists mainly of case studies. See, for example, UNCTAD (2007).
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(2007) documents the strong impact of FDI on consumer demand in new destinations. For example,
FDI played a major role in the tourism take-off in Tunisia in the 1970s, when investors such as Club
Med invented the concept of a beach resort. In a similar vein, in the Dominican Republic, despite
governmental investments to start a tourism industry in the 1970s, the real boom did not occur before
the massive influx of FDI from the 1980s onwards. UNCTAD (2007) documents also the case of Bhutan
and the United Republic of Tanzania where sharp increases in tourist arrival numbers appear to be
directly linked to FDI.
FDI raise the policy challenge of taking full advantage of these investments, that is to leverage
on the presence of FDI to foster domestic entrepreneurship. These policies consists, for example, in
minimizing leakages5, in improving the tourism value chain and, more generally, policies aimed at
boosting the net value of tourism that have the effect of increasing tourists’ length of stay.
The role of FDI in tourism is more nuanced than it is in some other sectors of the economy, and
it is valued because of the kick off to the tourism industry which it can provide, but it is also feared
for its impact on economic and cultural independence, and its potential damage to the communities
and the environment (UNCTAD, 2007). The country faces the risk of foreign domination, such as
enclaves and other strategies where the multinational limits the benefits for the host country and
where the country is therefore unable to capitalize on such investments. This is the case, for example,
of Punta Cana, a Dominican Republic island, where transnational corporations built small enclaves
equipped with their own essential services such as power, waste and water management and access
modes (UNCTAD, 2007). Brohman (1996) argues that foreign domination and external dependency
often seriously reduce tourism’s potential for generating broadly based growth and takes the case of
the Caribbean as an example, where a spatial polarization within both the modern tourism industry,
based on resort enclaves in the most desirable coastal locations, and the older agricultural-based
economy emerged. Battilani (2002) documents the investment strategy of a pool of entrepreneurs led
by Karim Aga Khan IV in the tourism untouched Costa Smeralda in Sardegna (Italy) during the
1960’s, who held the development of tourism and in general of the economic region under tight control
acquiring a monopoly position on the potentially usable land and controlling the administration and
the development of the region.
We consider the case of a multinational who builds and owns a resort in a new destination in a
LDC and study the multinational’s incentives to make the local community participant of the tourism
5Leakages in the tourism sense, that is negative national balance-of-payment effects such as the imports of goods and
the repatriation of profits.
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development. We show that under quite natural assumptions, tourists’ overnight stays are increasing
in the degree of diversification of tourism related products and services. Therefore, the multinational’s
profits are strictly related to the variety of tourism related goods and services and consequently the
multinational has an incentive to control its supply. In particular, the multinational faces two options.
On the one hand the multinational can try to control the variety of goods and services supplied by local
firms and on the other hand it can create an enclave and supply directly the preferred variety. In the
former case, in which tourism is based on culturally authentic goods and services, we assume that each
differentiated product is produced by a single firm and hence the number of tourism related products
supplied is a proxy for the local economic development induced by the multinational’s investments.
In the latter case, in which tourism is based on a fake but authentically staged local variety, the local
community does not benefit from the tourism activity.
Our analysis focuses on these forward linkages of FDI, that is the creation of new markets in a
LDC through the tourism product, and we neglect backward linkages established by resorts, that is
suppliers of intermediate consumption goods.
We consider a small open subsistence economy. All firms are price taker on the international
tourism market. We assume that the production of differentiated products necessitates a fixed set
up cost, which accounts for the shadow price of land and the cost of turning unproductive land into
productive land6. Available and potentially usable land is in perfect elastic supply up to a fixed level
and its supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic afterwards.
In Section 2 we characterize the representative consumer’s demand function consisting of overnight
stays, consumption of differentiated, tourism related products and non-tourism related products. We
show how the multinational’s profits from overnight stays and the supply of differentiated products
are related and that, from the multinational’s viewpoint, there exists an optimal degree of product
diversification. Therefore, if tourism products are supplied by the local community, where the local
variety is determined by a free entry condition, then there may be too many or too few products from
the multinational’s viewpoint. As a consequence, the multinational may have an incentive to either
foster or curb local economic development or eventually to substitute the local authentic variety of
tourism goods with an authentically staged variety supplied by the multinational. We show that, for
the multinational, subsidizing local development, that is subsidizing the local firm’s set up cost, is
6As argued above, tourism related FDI is most important for new destinations and in emerging economies. Once
the destination develops and becomes mature, the relative importance of FDI diminishes. Therefore, in this context
crowding out effects of FDI are negligible and we accordingly assume that the shadow price of land, which accounts for
alternative uses of land, is unaffected by the multinational’s investment strategy.
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never optimal. On the other hand we show that the multinational may curb local development, by
buying all the available land and reselling part of it at a positive margin. We further show that from
the multinational’s profits viewpoint this is equivalent to creating an enclave where the local variety
is authentically staged by the multinational. The difference between these two strategies is that in
the former case the variety is truly authentic, while in the second case it is an authentically staged
variety. We call these two strategies domination strategies since the multinational controls tourism
development in the host country7.
In Section 3 we discuss the effectiveness of policy instruments available to a local government who’s
aim is to maximize local economic development. We show that taxing the multinational’s activity as
well as subsidizing directly local economic development by subsidizing the firm’s set up cost may well be
counterproductive since it increases the multinational’s incentives to engage in a domination strategy.
On the other hand, we show that infrastructural investments aimed at increasing the potentially
available land may be beneficial since they reduce the multinational’s gains from domination strategies.
Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
In the first part of this section we describe the representative consumer’s tourism demand function.
We then characterize the supply side. We calculate the equilibrium number of differentiated, locally
supplied, tourism related products which is determined by a free entry condition and the optimal
supply of tourism related products from the multinational’s point of view. Finally, we characterize the
multinational’s optimal domination strategy.
2.1 Tourism demand
In this Section we characterize tourism demand consisting of nights spent in a destination, that is
overnight stays in the resort, and consumption of tourism related products. We consider a represen-
tative consumer endowed with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function exhibiting
7A further difference between the two strategies is that in the case of an enclave the production process is a vertically
integrated one, where the multinational acts as a coordinator of the supply, while in the case of a authentic local variety
the lack of coordination among producers may lead to a suboptimal outcome from the destination’s viewpoint.
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Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) love of variety preferences for differentiated tourism related goods
U (y, h, x1, ..., xi, ..., xn) =
{
yβ +
[
hγ +
(∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α
] β
γ
} 1
β
(1)
where y indicates a composite, non-touristic good, h indicates overnight stays and xi, for i = 1, ..., n,
indicates differentiated tourism related goods. We assume that at least one variety has to be offered
such that tourism is viable, i.e. n ≥ 1. We call T the tourism product, consisting of overnight stays
(h) and differentiated tourism related products ({xi}
n
i=1), i.e. T = (h, {xi}
n
i=1).
The representative consumer faces the budget constraint
y + phh+
∑n
i=1
pixi = R (2)
where R is his income, ph is the price of a single overnight stay, pi the price of xi and where the price
of the non-touristic good y has been normalized to 1.
Throughout the paper we assume the following.
Assumption 1 (i) 0 < β < 1, (ii) −∞ < γ < 0, (iii) 0 < α < 1, (iv) α > β.
Assumption 1 (i) implies that the non-touristic good y and the tourism product T are gross substi-
tutes; for β → 1 they are perfect substitutes. Assumption 1 (ii) implies that overnight stays and tourism
related products are gross complements, where for γ → −∞ they are perfect complements. Assump-
tion 1 (iii) implies that goods/services xi, i = 1,...,n, are gross substitutes. Assumption 1 (iv) states
that the gross substitutability of tourism related goods/services is greater than the gross substitutabil-
ity between the non-touristic goods (y) and the tourism product (T ). We define λβ =
β
1−β ∈ (0,∞),
λγ =
γ
1−γ ∈ (−1, 0), λα =
1−α
α
∈ (0,∞). We assume symmetry on the supply side where pi = p and
therefore in equilibrium xi = x, for i = 1,...,n.
Assumption 2 Prices p and ph and income R are such that the following inequalities are satisfied:
(i)
ph
[
1 +
(
p
ph
)−λγ]1 + pλβh
[
1 +
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ > R zph > ph
(
1 + p
λβ
h
)
(ii) ph > p and
p
ph
<
(
−
λγ
λβ
)− 1λγ
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Assumption 2 (i) guarantees that the below defined profit maximization problem of the multina-
tional has an internal maximum. In particular, if the first inequality is not satisfied then the preferred
number of tourism related products to be supplied, if the multinational does not engage in a domina-
tion strategy, is the minimum possible, i.e. n = 1. If the second inequality is not satisfied, then the
solution diverges to infinity. Assumption 2 (ii) states that the price of an overnight stay is larger than
the price of tourism related products and further that the substitutability between the non-touristic
good (y) and the tourism product (T ) is sufficiently low.
Maximizing (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 The optimal number of overnight stays is strictly increasing in n, i.e. h′ (n) > 0; (ii) the
demand of differentiated products is strictly deceasing in n, i.e. x′ (n) < 0; (iii) the demand of the
non-touristic good is strictly decreasing in n, i.e. y′ (n) < 0.
Lemma 1 relates the degree of differentiation of the tourism product (n) to the number of overnight
stays. In particular, it states that the more "sophisticated" is the tourism product, that is the greater
is n, the more days tourists spend in a given destination and hence the greater is their expenditure on
overnight stays. A sufficient condition for this result to hold is that either overnight stays and tourism
related products are gross complements, or that the non-touristic good and the tourism product T are
gross substitutes8. The assumption about the gross substitutability of non-touristic goods with the
tourism product T implies that an increase in n decreases demand for and expenditure on non-touristic
goods and therefore increases the consumers’ expenditure on touristic goods. Moreover, Assumptions 1
(i) and (iv) guarantee that, as n increases, the demand of x decreases (h increases) at a faster pace than
if β = 0. The assumption of greater substitutability between tourism related goods than between the
non-touristic good and the tourism product T leads consumers to spend relatively more on overnight
stays and relatively less on tourism related products as n increases.
2.2 Supply side
For simplicity’s sake we assume that available and potentially usable land is in perfect elastic supply
up to a fixed level N and its supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic afterwards. The firm’s set up
cost is c.
8If β = 0, that is the non-touristic good y and the tourism product T are independent, and γ = 0, that is if overnight
stays and the differentiated tourism goods are independent, then the demand for overnight stays h is independent of n.
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In this section we focus on the case where differentiated products and services are produced by
local firms, that is the case of a culturally authentic local variety, and show how the multinational’s
interests may be conflicting with those of a local government whose aim we assume to be the promotion
of local economic development.
We assume that each differentiated product/service is produced by a single firm and that production
cost are nil9. The free entry condition for local firms is
px
(
nL
)
= c (3)
which implicitly defines the number of firms operating in the tourism sector nL. Notice that nL ≥ 1
if c is sufficiently low, that uniqueness is guaranteed by the fact that x (n) is strictly decreasing in n
and that nL is decreasing in c
p
. We also assume that N ≥ nL.
In order to calculate the optimal degree of tourism product differentiation from the multinational’s
viewpoint, we calculate the optimal resort capacity in terms of overnight stays. Assuming a quadratic
cost function for the production of overnight stays z 12h
2, the multinational’s profits are10
pi = phh− z
1
2
h2
Since overnight stays depend on n we can characterize nM , which is the optimal n from the multi-
national’s viewpoint. First order condition yields nM , which is implicitly defined by h
(
nM
)
= ph
z
.
Assumption 2 together with h′ (n) > 0 guarantee that there exists a unique nM which is strictly
increasing in phz .
The following Lemma establishes the relationship between nM and nL.
Lemma 2 Given z, p and ph, let (ce, ne) be the unique solution to x (n
e) = c
e
p
h (ne) = phz
(4)
then: (i) for c = ce, nM = nL = ne; (ii) for c > ce, nM −nL > 0 and where the difference is increasing
in c; (iii) c < ce, nL − nM > 0 and where the difference is decreasing in c.
9Assuming in addition to fixed setup costs constant marginal costs of production would not change the qualitative
results.
10We normalize the multinational’s fixed costs (or set up costs), to zero, and consider only operating revenues and
costs. Taking entry cost into account would affect the multinational’s decision to enter the destination or not.
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According to Lemma 2, depending on the value c takes, the local community’s interest, that is
to promote local economic development, and the multinational’s, which lies in the exploitation of
profit opportunities, may either be conflicting or aligned. In particular, there exists a critical cost
level ce above which the degree of product differentiation provided by the local community is too low
compared with the multinational’s optimal level and below which it is too large. These conflicting
interests raise the problem that the multinational may try to control the provision of tourism related
products, thereby sustaining or hampering local economic development.
2.3 The multinational’s domination strategy
We consider the case where (a) the multinational finances local development by subsidizing local firms’
set up cost which becomes c+ s, s ∈ (−c, 0) and (b) the multinational buys all the available land N at
the price c, becoming in this way a monopolist, and resells it at a cost c + s, s ∈ (0,∞). The former
case may be relevant if the local community supplies too few differentiated products compared with
the multinational’s optimal level, while the latter case addresses the issue of an excess-differentiation.
Later on we argue that, from the multinational’s viewpoint, the latter situation is equivalent to creating
an enclave, the only difference being that if tourism related products are produced by local firms, then
they are culturally authentic goods while in the case of an enclave they consist of fake, but authentically
staged products.
Given the value of s, if differentiated goods and services are produced by local firms, then the free
entry condition (3) reads
px (n) = c+ s (5)
which implicitly defines the equilibrium number of local firms n (s), with n′ (s) < 0. In the present
context, because of (5), choosing s is equivalent to choosing n. Therefore, the multinational’s problem
is to choose n which maximizes profits from its core business, that is profits from overnight stays, and
profits or losses related to the direct or indirect control of the degree of product differentiation.
Consider first the multinational’s incentives to subsidizes local development. For this purpose we
have to compare the multinational’s profits if it subsidizes local development, that is maxs≤0 pi (s),
where pi (s) = pi (n (s)) + sn (s), with those if it does not intervene, i.e. pi
(
nL
)
. The following
proposition can be proved.
Proposition 1 Subsidizing local development is never optimal.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. Because of the assumption of greater gross substitutability
between the single tourism related goods than between the non-touristic good and the tourism product
T (Assumption 1 (iv)), the demand x (n) decreases at a faster pace as n increases. As a consequence,
it is more costly to increase n and the gains from an increase in n are outweighed by the cost of doing
so.
Notice that a consequence of Proposition 1 is that, if an enclave is optimal, then the degree of
product differentiation will never be larger than the one provided by the local community. The intuition
for this is as follows. As argued below, the multinational’s profits are the same if it creates an enclave
or if it buys all the land and resells it at a margin or discount to local producers. In subsidizing local
firms, the multinational operates as if it buys all the requested land for a given, announced s < 0 and
resells it to local firms at a price c + s. Since subsidizing is never optimal, it follows that it is never
optimal to buy more than the required amount of land for an announced s < 0 and to resell it at
a discounted price c + s. Therefore, if subsidizing the set up cost is never optimal, then it is never
optimal to create an enclave with more differentiated products.
Let us consider the case where the multinational hampers local development or creates an enclave.
The multinational acquires a monopoly position by buying all the available land N and then resells it
at an increased price c + s, s ∈ (0,∞). Since Proposition 1 states that s ∈ (−c, 0) is never optimal,
the multinational’s problem can be written as
max
s
Π (s) = pi (n (s)) + (c+ s)n (s)− cN (6)
or using (5), equivalently
max
n
Π (n) = pi (n) + px (n)n− cN (7)
The first element of (6) and/or (7) are profits related to the firm’s core business, while the remaining
two elements are associated with the buying and selling of land (i.e. domination strategy). Notice
that, in the case of an enclave, the multinational’s profits are given by (7)11. The reason for this is as
follows. To create an enclave the multinational has to acquire a monopoly position, that is to eliminate
all potential competition from local producers (third element in (7)). Selling the authentically staged
variety to the tourists yields the multinational proceeds px (n)n, the second element in (7), while the
11We implicitly assume that the tourist’s demand is independent of whether tourism related goods are authentic or
fake, but authentically staged, and that the production costs are the same. The qualitative results stated in the paper
hold also if this assumption is to be relaxed, that is if tourists prefer one over the other, and/or if the production costs
differ.
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first element in (7) represents the multinational’s proceeds from the core business.
In choosing n, or equivalently s, the multinational has to trade off gains/costs from its core business
against gains/costs related to the domination strategy. We first show that a unique n∗ = argmaxnΠ (n)
to the problem (7) exists and, using (5), we characterize the corresponding s∗. We then derive condi-
tions such that restraining local development, or equivalently creating an enclave, is optimal.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique n%, with ∂
∂z
n∗ < 0.
Since s and n are related through (5), Lemma 3 states that there exists a unique s∗ which maximizes
the multinational’s profits. Moreover, it states that s∗ is increasing in the cost parameter z. The reason
for this result is that the larger are the costs associated with its core business, the more profitable
becomes the domination strategy and hence it is optimal to increase s∗. Moreover, from (6) and Lemma
3 we observe that n∗ is independent of c and therefore, by using (5), we have that s∗ is decreasing in
c. The following result characterizes s∗.
Lemma 4 For c ≤ ce, and also for some values of c > ce, s% > 0.
Lemma 4 states that the multinational may have an incentive to engage in a domination strategy
even though this worsens its core business. The intuition for this result is the following. For c < ce,
where nL > nM , a positive s leads to gains in the core business as well as gains from the domination
strategy. Consequently, s∗ > 0 is optimal. If c = ce, then from Lemma 2 we know that the free
entry condition leads to an equilibrium with maximizes the multinational’s profits in the absence of
domination activity, i.e. nL = nM = ne. Because of the local concavity of the profit function pi,
increasing s leads to a second order loss in its core business and to a first order gain in its domination
activity. As a consequence, engaging in a domination strategy is optimal for c = ce. By continuity the
first order gain from a domination strategy is larger than the second order loss in the core business
also for some values of c > ce, where nL < nM .
Summing up, we observe that if nL ≥ nM , then s∗ > 0. Moreover, the larger the difference between
nL and nM , i.e. the lower is c (see Lemma 2), the larger is s∗ and the larger are the gains associated
with the domination strategy. For some nL < nM , s∗ > 0 is still optimal and increasing the difference
between nL and nM , that is increasing c (see Lemma 2), decreases s∗.
The next proposition characterizes the multinational’s incentives to curb local development, or
equivalently to create an enclave.
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Proposition 2 There exists a threshold N such that for all N > N engaging in a domination strategy
(s∗ > 0) is never optimal, while for N < N engaging in a domination strategy is optimal. N is
decreasing in c and increasing in z.
Proposition 2 states that the lower is the availability of potentially useful land (N) and/or the
lower are the set up costs of a local variety (c), the more likely it is that the multinational engages in a
dominating strategy. The intuition for this result is that the lower is N and/or c, the cheaper it is for
the multinational to acquire a monopoly position and therefore to control local economic development.
On the other hand, the larger is z, the larger are the costs associated with its core business and
therefore the more profitable becomes the domination strategy.
3 Economic policy
In this section we address the issue of the effectiveness of some economic policy options available to a
local government who aims at leveraging on the multinational’s investment. In particular, we consider
policies which consist in trying to reduce the enclave risk and to maximize local economic development.
We analyze the consequences of (i) subsidizing the set up cost c, (ii) taxing multinational’s activity (in
particular its inputs) and (iii) increasing the potentially available land N . In case (i) the government
tries directly to foster local development, subsidizing the local firms’ set up costs. In case (ii) we
consider taxes on the multinational’s purchases and activities (for example, taxing the multinational’s
imports), which we model by considering in the above analysis z instead of z, where z = z (1 + t) and
t > 0 is the marginal, constant, tax rate12. The government may try in this way to cash in on the
multinational’s activity. In case (iii) the government invests in infrastructure, thereby increasing the
amount of land which may be put to productive use (at unit cost c).
Case (i). We have to distinguish between the case where engaging in a dominating strategy is
and is not optimal. Consider first the case where the multinational does not engage in a dominating
strategy (N > N). Tourism products are supplied by local firms and subsidizing the firm’s set up cost
increases the degree of product differentiation and fosters local economic development. But since N
is decreasing in c, a too strong subsidy leads the multinational to take a dominating position. Once
N < N , Lemma 3 states that an optimal n∗ exists, which is independent of c and hence the effects of
further decreases in c are offset by increases in s∗.13 Therefore, for N < N , this policy instrument is
12The range of variation of the tax rate t is restricted by Assumption 2.
13We implicitly assume that the government cannot tie in the granting of the subsidy with a no-sale clause of the land.
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ineffective. Consequently, economic policy aimed at directly sustaining economic development may be
partly, completely or more than offset by a multinational’s domination strategy. Subsidies may have
the perverse effect of curbing instead of sustaining economic development. To see this, consider the
case of N being larger than, but very close to N . A decrease in c may lead to N < N and therefore
to a domination position (s∗ > 0), which may well lead to an overall reduction in n.
Case (ii). From Lemma 2, considering z instead of z, we observe that ce is increasing in z, where,
for c > ce, nM − nL > 0 with nM − nL decreasing in z, while for c < ce, nL − nM > 0, with
nL − nM increasing in z.14 Lemma 4 and the positive relationship between N and z implies that the
larger are taxes, that is the larger is z, the greater are the multinational’s incentives to engage in a
domination strategy. Moreover, from Lemma 3 we know that s∗ is increasing in z. The intuition for
these results is as follows. Increasing taxes t increases the multinational’s costs associated with its
core business and hence a domination strategy becomes more attractive. As a consequence, as long as
N is larger than N , small taxes on the multinational’s activity lead to tax yields and do not induce
the multinational to engage in a domination strategy. But if taxes are too large and N < N , then
the multinational engages in a domination strategy, where larger taxes imply a stronger domination
position and therefore a stronger restrain on economic development. Therefore, the government has to
trade off welfare benefits from tax yields against their costs owing to a reduced economic development.
If the government wants to promote economic development through tourism, a complete or partial tax
exemption for the multinational may be preferable.
Case (iii). From the analysis above it follows that increasing N , by increasing the multinational’s
costs of engaging in a domination strategy, decreases the profitability of such investments. This
policy unambiguously decreases the multinational’s incentives to engage in a domination strategy and
therefore increases the possibility for the local community to benefit from tourism FDI. It remains
an open question how to finance such investments. The government may well try to pursue a mixed
strategy, that is financing infrastructural investments through taxes on the multinational’s activity,
under the constraint that N > N . Moreover, the government may also try to tie in tourism FDI with
infrastructural investments, that is to approve FDI only if these are associated with infrastructural
investments aimed at avoiding domination strategies.
14To see this consider the case where c = ce. Given that an increase (decrease) in z leads to an increase (decrease) in
ce we are, for a constant value of c, in case Lemma 2 (iii) (in case Lemma 2 (ii)) where, since nL is independent of z,
nL = ne > nM (nL = ne < nM ).
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4 Conclusion
The present paper analyzed the forward linkages of a multinational’s investment in a resort that kicks
off the tourism sector in a LDC. We showed that, under Assumption 1, overnight stays are increasing
in the number of differentiated tourism related goods and services, which, if supplied by local firms,
is a proxy for the economic development induced by FDI. We therefore argued that the multinational
has an incentive to control the variety of these goods supplied in equilibrium. We showed that it is
never optimal for a multinational to subsidizes local development and showed that the multinational
may engage in a domination strategy aimed at reducing or even eliminating the host country’s benefits
from the tourism activity. This result is in keeping with the historical evidence that the presence of
enclaves is associated with a low degree of differentiation of tourism related products. We analyzed the
effectiveness of some policy instruments available to a local government whose goal is to leverage on the
multinational’s investments and we showed that domination strategies can be avoided by engaging in
infrastructural investments designed to increase the potentially available land or by reducing taxes on
multinationals acquisitions and expenses. This latter point complements the traditional argument in
favor of tax reductions or exemptions for FDI based on the presumption that the supply of international
capital is elastic relative to domestic capital (see, for example, Hanson, 2001). Subsidizing directly
local development may be counterproductive since it increases the multinational’s incentives to adopt
a domination strategy.
These policy conclusions are in keeping with some policies undertaken by governments of LDCs.
Endo (2006) reports that many LDCs grant the multinational duty free imports. Even though this
increases leakages, according to our analysis it decreases the multinational’s incentives to engage in
domination strategies and therefore it increases the possibility for the host country to leverage on FDI
in the tourism sector. UNCTAD (2007) documents that the majority of financial incentives to attract
tourism related FDI consists in tax incentives (tax rebates) and duty-free imports of inputs. Battilani
(2001) documents that starting from 1978 the government has accompanied the strong influx of FDI in
some small, uninhabited islands of the Maldives with infrastructural investments aimed at increasing
the tourists’ mobility. According to our analysis, these investments increased the multinationals’ costs
of creating enclaves and therefore it increased the chances for the host country to benefit from the
tourism activity. In a similar vein, tourism in Punta Cana in the Dominican Republic, which was
initially confined to small enclaves, took off only after investments in resorts by Club Med where tied
to the construction of a new local international airport (see UNCTAD, 2007), opening up tourism also
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in other areas and paving the way for the region’s economic development.
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5 Appendix
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1]Using Lagrange, the first order conditions read:
{
yβ +
[
hγ +
(∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α
] β
γ
} 1
β−1
yβ−1 = λ (8)
{
yβ +
[
hγ +
(∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α
] β
γ
} 1
β−1 [
hγ +
(∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α
] β
γ−1
hγ−1 = λph (9)
{
yβ +
[
hγ +
(∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α
] β
γ
} 1
β−1 [
hγ +
(∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α
] β
γ−1 (∑n
i=1
xαi
) γ
α−1
xα−1i = λpi, (10)
for i = 1, ..., n where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Using the assumption that all local firms are symmetric we have pi = p and hence obtain xi = x,
for each i = 1, ..., n. From (9) and (10) we obtain
x = h
(
p
ph
n1−
γ
α
) 1
γ−1
(11)
while from (9) and (8) we obtain
ph =
(
hγ + n
γ
αxγ
) β
γ−1 hγ−1
yβ−1
which, using (11), reads as
y = hp
1
1−β
h
[
1 + n
γ
1−γ
1−α
α
(
p
ph
) γ
γ−1
](βγ−1) 1β−1
(12)
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Finally, we calculate h substituting (11) and (12) into the budget constraint (2)
h =
R
k (n)
(13)
where
k (n) = ph
[
1 + n
γ
1−γ
1−α
α
(
p
ph
) γ
γ−1
]p β1−βh
[
1 + n
γ
1−γ
1−α
α
(
p
ph
) γ
γ−1
]− β
1−β
1−γ
γ
+ 1
 . (14)
We can rewrite (14) as
k (n) = ph
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]1 + pλβh
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ , (15)
with
k′ (n) = phλγλαn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ 1 + λγ − λβλγ pλβh
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ . (16)
Using Assumption 1, which implies that λβ > 0, −1 < λγ < 0 and that λα > 0, we have that k′ (n) < 0,
and thus h (n) is strictly increasing in n. Moreover we can write
x =
R
p
[
n−λγλα
(
p
ph
)λγ
+ 1
] 1
n+ p
λβ
h
[
n
−
λγ
λβ + n
λγλα−
λγ
λβ
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ
which, since Assumption 1 (iv) implies that λαλβ < 1, is strictly decreasing in n, and
y = R
1
1 + p
−λβ
h
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]λβλγ
which is decreasing in n.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2] The result follows from system (4). An intuitive proof is as follows.
Suppose we are initially in the equilibrium c = ce, where nM = nL = ne. An increase in c leads to
a reduction in nL while nM remains unaffected. Hence, nM = ne > nL. A decrease in c leads to an
increase in nL and therefore nM = ne < nL.
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] We establish the result by showing that ∂∂npi (n) < 0, for each
s < 0. Using (5), the profit function pi reads
pi (n) = phh (n)−
1
2
zh (n)2 + [px (n)− c]n
We rewrite the relationship between x (n) and h (n) in (11) as follows
x (n) = h (n)nλγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ−1
(17)
which allows us to write the multinational’s profits as
pi (n)
ph
= h (n)
[
1−
1
2
z
ph
h (n) + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]
−
c
ph
n
Taking the first derivative with respect to n we obtain
1
ph
∂
∂n
pi (n) = h′ (n)
[
1−
z
ph
h (n) + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]
+ λγλαn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
h (n)−
c
ph
Using h′ (n) = −h (n) k
′(n)
k(n) , and substituting the expressions for k
′ (n) and k (n), we obtain after
rearranging terms
1
ph
∂
∂npi (n) = −
h(n)
[k(n)]2
λγλαn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
php
λβ
h
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ− zphR
 1
p
λβ
h
[
1+nλγλα
(
p
ph
)
−λγ
]
−
λβ
λγ
+ λγ−λβλγ
− λβλγ [1 + nλγλα ( pph)−λγ] k (n)
− cph
The first term in curled brackets is negative and therefore a sufficient condition for 1
ph
∂
∂n
Π (n) < 0 to
hold is that
h (n)
k (n)
λαλβn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
php
λβ
h
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]1−λβλγ
<
c
ph
Substituting the expression for k (n) and rearranging terms this inequality reads
[
h (n)λαλβn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
−
c
ph
]
p
λβ
h
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ
<
c
ph
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A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that
λαλβh (n)n
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
<
c
ph
which, after using (17), simplifies to
px (n) <
c
λαλβ
Using Assumption 1, which implies that λαλβ < 1, and the free entry condition (5) px (n) = c + s,
this inequality reads
s < c
1− λαλβ
λαλβ
This last inequality is always satisfied for s < 0 and therefore ∂
∂n
pi (n) < 0 for all s < 0 which implies
that s < 0 can never be optimal.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 3] Rewriting Π (n) using the relationship between x (n) and h (n) as in
(17) we obtain
Π (n)
ph
= h (n)
[
1−
1
2
z
ph
h (n) + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]
−
c
ph
N
Taking the first derivative with respect to n we obtain
1
ph
∂
∂n
Π (n) = h′ (n)
[
1−
z
ph
h (n) + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]
+ λγλαn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
h (n)
which, after using h′ (n) = −h (n) k
′(n)
k(n) , can be written as
1
ph
∂
∂n
Π (n) = −h(n)
k(n)
{
k′ (n)
[
1− z
ph
h (n) + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]
+
−λγλαnλγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
k (n)
}
Substituting the expression for k (n) and k′ (n) and rearranging terms we obtain
∂
∂n
Π(n)
ph
= − h(n)
[k(n)]2
λγλαn
λγλα−1
(
p
ph
)−λγ
php
λβ
h
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ− zphR
 1
p
λβ
h
[
1+nλγλα
(
p
ph
)
−λγ
]
−
λβ
λγ
+ λγ−λβλγ
 +
−λβ
λγ
[
1 + nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ]
k (n)
}
(18)
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where the term in the first line, multiplying the two terms in curled brackets, is positive; the first
term in curled brackets (in the second line) is negative, decreasing in n, converges to zero in the
limit of n → 0 and to − zphR
(
p
−λβ
h +
λγ−λβ
λγ
)
for n → ∞; the second term in curled brackets (in
the third line) is positive, decreasing in n, converges to ∞ for n → 0 and, since limn→∞ k (n) =
ph
(
1 + p
λβ
h
)
, it converges to −λβ
λγ
ph
(
1 + p
λβ
h
)
for n → ∞. Consequently, a unique maximum exists
if z
ph
R
(
p
−λβ
h + 1−
λβ
λγ
)
> −λβ
λγ
ph
(
1 + p
λβ
h
)
, i.e. for R z
ph
sufficiently large. Notice that, since
−
λβ
λγ
ph
(
1 + p
λβ
h
)
(
p
−λβ
h + 1−
λβ
λγ
) < ph (1 + pλβh ) ,
Assumption 1 guarantees that a unique maximum exists. Moreover, the profit function Π (n) is locally
concave at n∗.
Since 1
ph
∂2
∂z∂n
Π (n) < 0, ∂
∂z
n∗ < 0 and therefore ∂
∂z
s∗ > 0
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 4] We show that, for c = ce and n = nM , ∂∂n
Π(n)
ph
∣∣∣
n=nM
< 0 and therefore
s∗ > 0 follows. Using the relationship between x (n) and h (n) in (17), we can write profits as
Π (n)
ph
= pi (n) + h (n)nλγλα
(
p
ph
)−λγ
−
c
ph
N
Taking the first derivative and evaluating the expression at n = nM and c = ce, and taking into
account that pi′
(
nM
)
= 0, we obtain
1
ph
∂
∂n
Π (n)|n=nM ,c=ce =
(
p
ph
)−λγ (
nM
)λγλα [
h′
(
nM
)
+ λγλαh
(
nM
) (
nM
)−1]
or
1
ph
∂
∂n
Π (n)|n=nM ,c=ce =
(
p
ph
)−λγ (
nM
)λγλα
h
(
nM
) (
nM
)−1 [
−
k′
(
nM
)
k (nM )
nM + λγλα
]
Using k′
(
nM
)
and k (n), and rearranging terms we obtain that 1
ph
∂
∂n
Π (n)|n=nM ,c=ce < 0 if
[
−
λβ
λγ
(
nM
)λγλα ( p
ph
)−λγ
− 1
]
p
λβ
h
[
1 +
(
nM
)λγλα ( p
ph
)−λγ]−λβλγ
< 1
Since the first term in squared brackets is decreasing in nM and since n ≥ 1, a sufficient condition for
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the inequality to hold is that
−
λβ
λγ
(
p
ph
)−λγ
< 1
which, because of Assumption 2, is always satisfied. By continuity, it follows that s∗ > 0 is optimal
also for some values of c > ce.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 2] For n∗ < N , ∂∂N Π˜ < 0 and, using the envelope theorem,
∂
∂c Π˜ < 0.
Consequently, for N sufficiently large Π˜ < pi
(
nL
)
. Let us next characterize the threshold N . Notice
that we restrict the analysis to the case c < ce, where s∗ > 0.
For c < ce, ∂
∂c
pi
(
nL
)
> 0, while ∂
∂c
Π˜ < 0. As a consequence, N is decreasing in c.
Using the envelope theorem, we observe that ∂
∂z
Π˜ < 0. For c < ce, ∂
∂z
pi
(
nL
)
= − 12h
(
nL
)2
, while
∂
∂z
Π˜ = − 12h
(
nM
)2
. Since h′ (n) > 0, nM < nL and nM is increasing in z,
∣∣∣ ∂∂z Π˜∣∣∣ < ∣∣ ∂∂zpi (nL)∣∣, that is
profits in the case of a domination strategy decrease at a lower pace than profits without a domination
strategy. As a consequence N is increasing in z.
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